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CASE NOTES
inmates iii United States prisons. In this way
prisoners would not have to be absent from their
institutions nor would there be any incentive for
them to bring a complaint merely to get out of jail
for a hearing.
Although the exact procedure put into effect
may not be as proposed, the point remains that
some form of judicial or prison administered review
system would be desirable. It would hopefully
allow for the fair adjudication of prisoner com-
plaints without, at the same time, overburdening
the courts. Without a doubt any completely
adequate means for the protection of prisoner's
rights will be expensive, but a truly civilized society
must bear the additional cost in order to protect
the fundamental personal rights of all its members.
CASE NOTES*
An editorial comment accompanying a Note represents the opinion of the student who "prepared




When Miranda Warnings Are Required-Sate
v. Billings, 436 P.2d 212 (Nev. 1968); People v.
P., 233 N.E.2d 255 (N.Y. 1968). In Billings,
the defendant called the police station and reported
killing his wife. When the police arrived at his
home, they asked him what was the matter and
Billings told them what had happened. He was
taken to the station where officers made an at-
tempt to give the Miranda warnings. Billings
interrupted and told the officers he knew his rights
and continued to talk. The Miranda warnings
were not given at any time. The Supreme Court
of Nevada viewed the purpose of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), to be the elimination
of compulsion inherent in police interrogation. It
noted language in Miranda to the effect that
volunteered statements are not barred by the
Fifth Amendment and the Miranda decision did
not affect their admissibility. It thus held the
statements admissible, since they were voluntary
and not given in response to police interrogation
within the intendment of Miranda.
In People v. P., an officer went to the defendant's
home to question him about a specific crime in
which the defendant had been implicated by an
accomplice. The officer asked the defendant's
companions to leave before he started the question-
ing but did not tell the defendant that he was
under arrest, nor was he physically restrained
in any way.
The Court of Appeals of New York held, on the
basis of a two part test to determine when Miranda
warnings must be given, that the defendant's
statements were admissible even though the warn-
ings had not been given. It announced the test
that Miranda warnings must be given when two
conditions are met; first, when the individual is
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way or is led to reasonably believe he is so de-
prived, and, second, when the circumstances are
likely to affect substantially the individual's will
to resist and to compel him to speak when he would
not otherwise do so freely.
The first part of the test was based on the lan-
guage in Miranda that the warnings should be
given when an individual is taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way. The second part of the test
was derived from the view of this court of the
basic purpose of Miranda. It felt that the purpose
of Miranda was to preserve the individual's
choice of whether or not to speak. Consequently
it would not be enough to ask whether the indi-
vidual reasonably believed himself to be in cus-
tody. In addition, it is also necessary to consider
whether the individual felt compelled to speak.
The court related the second part of the test to the
language of Miranda by arguing that this consider-
ation went to the question of whether or not the
individual was or reasonably felt himself signifi-
cantly deprived of freedom of action.
Justice Burke dissented in People v. P. He was
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of the view that the defendant had been deprived
of his freedom in a significant way and that, there-
fore, the warnings were required. On the other
hand, he disapproved of an extension of the
Miranda warnings to situations where a person
who is not restrained of his freedom may *never-
theless feel compelled to respond to an inquiry.
Pre-Trial Identification By Snapshots-Simmons
v. United States,-U.S.-(1968). The petitioners
were tried for the armed robbery of a federally
insured savings and loan association. On the same
day as the robbery, two FBI agents came to the
house of one of the petitioners' mothers and
searched the home without a warrant and without
permission. The agent found two suitcases con-
taining a gun holster, a sack similar to one used
in the robbery, and several coin cards and bill
wrappers from the bank which had been robbed.
The next day, the FBI obtained snapshots of the
suspect to help the bank employees identify the
robbers. One of the petitioners was clearly identi-
fied by the bank employees as one of the robbers,
while another defendant was identified by three
of five bank employees. All the employees agreed
one of the robbers was unidentifiable. Prior to the
trial, the defendant moved to suppress the Govern-
ment's exhibit consisting of the suitcase contain-
ing the incriminating items. In order to establish
standing, the petitioner testified that the suitcase
was similar to one he owned. The motion to sup-
press was denied, and his testimony concerning
the suitcase was admitted against him at trial.
During the trial, all the'bank employees identi-
fied one of the petitioners as one of the robbers.
Three of them identified another defendant as
the second robber. These defendants petitioned
to have the snapshots produced which had been
shown to the witnesses before trial. This petition
was denied.
Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court
to consider the following claims: (1) the assertion
that pre-trial identification by means of photo-
graphs was so suggestive and conducive to mis-
representation as to be a denial of due process of
law; (2) the denial to produce the photographs
was error; and (3) one petitioner contended that
his constitutional rights were violated when testi-
mony given by him in support of his "suppression"
motion was admitted against him at trial. The
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction on the
first two claims but reversed as to the third.
In support of the first' claim, the petitioner
argued that the 'line-up" decisions are control-
ling-United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)
and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
These cases reasoned that an accused is entitled
to counsel at any "critical stage of the prosecu-
tion," and that a post-indictment line-up is such
a "critical stage". The petitioner here did not
assert he was entitled to counsel at the time the
snapshots were 'shown for identification 'but
rather that the identification procedure was un-
duly prejudicial.' The Supreme Court therefore
examined the totality of surrounding circum-
stances. Here, despite hazards of initial identifica-
tion by photographs, the danger that "the use of
this technique may result in convictions based
on misidentifications may be substantially lessened
by a course of cross-examination at trial". Viewing
the facts of this case, the Supreme Court decided
that the "photographic identification procedure
was not so impermissibly suggestive as to give
rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification:"-In conclusion, no denial of due
process of law resulted and a reversal Was denied
on this ground.
The second claim stated that there was error
in refusing the defendant's request that the photo-
graphs shown to the witnesses prior to trial be
turned over to the defense for purposes of cross-
examination. The claim is based on the Jencks
Act which came in response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657
(1956), wherein it was held that "after a witness
has testified for the Government in a federal crimi-
nal prosecution the Government must, on request
of the defense, produce any statement .. . of the
witness in the possession of the United States,
which relates to the subject matter" testified to
by the witness. Petitioners contend that the photo-
graphs should be incorporated into the written
statements of- the witnesses, and therefore must
be produced. Incorporation is allowed if the photo-
graphs constitute a part of the written statement.
However, such is not the case here. The written
statements were taken before the witnesses had
seen the pictures and therefore not incorporated.
The Supreme Court concluded that "the strength
of the eyewitness identifications renders it. highly
unlikely that nonproduction of the photographs
caused him any prejudice."
The final contention was that it was reversible
error to allow the Government to use the testimony
1968]
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given by the defendant upon an unsuccessful mo-
tion to suppress evidence. In circumstances as
here, a defendant with a substantial claim for the
exclusion of evidence may conclude that the ad-
mission of the evidence is preferable to risking
the admission of his own testimony connecting
himself with the seized evidence. Therefore, the
lower court's rule imposes upon a defendant a
condition which may deter him from asserting a
Fourth Amendment objection. If a defendant who
wished to establish standing must do so at the risk
that the words which he utters may later be used
to incriminate him, his constitutional rights may
be severely restricted. In these circumstances, the
Supreme Court found it "intolerable that one
constitutional right (Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination) should have to be
surrendered in order to assert another." The
Supreme Court held that "when a defendant testi-
fies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on
Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may
not therefore be admitted against him at trial
on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection."
Conviction was reversed for this defendant and
the case remanded for further proceedings.
Determination Of Sanity By Trier Of Facts-
People v. Custer, 67 Cal.Rptr.39 (Ct. App., 1968).
Defendant was convicted of second degree murder
and appealed. His appeal is based on the contention
that he was deprived of his constitutional rights
under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments because he was denied due process of law
and a full and fair trial. He claims he was insane
at the time the crime was committed and there-
fore incapable of being convicted.
The victim of the homicide was the nine year
old child of appellant's wife by a former marriage.
An autopsy revealed that the cause of death was
asphysim "due to impaction of a sponge into the
pharynx". Appellant later testified that he gagged
his wife and the deceased child so he could get
away and prove that his wife was involved in a
communistic plot.
Following appellant's arraignment, he entered
pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of
insanity. Two psychiatrists were then appointed
to examine the appellant. Both reported that,
in their opinion, appellant had been insane at
the time of the commission of the offense and also
incompetent at the time of trial and unable to
aid in the conduct of his defense. Under the au-
thority of Section 1368 of the Penal Code, further
proceedings were suspended and the defendant was
committed until such time as he should be re-
stored to sanity.
A certification of sanity was received by the
court which ordered the appellant to return for
further proceedings. Five psychiatrists were called
and three were of the opinion that appellant was
insane at the time of commission of the offense
in question. The court found the defendant guilty,
and an appeal was filed challenging the propriety
of the court's finding on the issue of sanity. The
appellant stresses the fact that a majority of the
psychiatrists called found him insane, and no
substantial evidence apart from these reports
could form the basis of a sanity determination.
An earlier case, People v. Wolff, 61 Cal.Rptr.
2nd 795, 805 (1964) had used language opposing
these contentions: "It is settled that the conduct
and declaration of the defendant occurring within
a reasonable time before or after the commission
of the alleged act are admissiable in proof of his
mental condition at the time of the offense."
The trial judge in the instant case noted appellant's
conduct and his statements to police at the time
of his arrest which showed that he planned his
acts and understood they were wrong.
The appellant also argued that the trial judge's
comment that defendant was presumed to be sane
was prejudicial since it did not comply with a code
provision putting the burden of proof on the
insanity issue on the defendant. The court said
"there was no indication that by use of the word
'presumed', it was placing any greater burden of
proof upon appellant than that presently imposed
by statute". The judgment of the lower court was
affirmed.
Delinquency Must Be Proved Beyond A Reason-
able Doubt-People v. Urbasek, 232 N.E.2d 716
(Ill. 1967). The defendant, eleven years old,
appealed this conviction as a delinquent for the
murder of another eleven year old. The deceased,
and defendant had been playing together for
four hours prior to the discovery of the body. At
that time, 3 o'clock p.m., the deceased's mother
began looking for her missing daughter. After
questioning Robert periodically, she demanded
to look in his garage. Between 7 o'clock and 8
o'clock the girl's body was found with seven stab
wounds.
Defense counsel made a timely objection to
the standard of proof-a preponderance of the
evidence-which was applied in finding Robert to
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be a delinquent. He argued that such a test is a
deprivation of due process.
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. It noted
that the preponderance of the evidence test was
tolerated for years by saying that the juvenile
court was a civil court, designed to informally
assist and treat, rather than to punish. This view
was frequently attacked, but prevailed until It
Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), in which Mr. Justice
Fortas, speaking for the majority, said the Four-
teenth Amendment was not for adults only. The
essentials of due process required that an ajudica-
tion of delinquency include adequate notice of
charges, right to counsel, privilege against self
incrimination, and the right to cross-examination
and confrontation of witnesses.
The Illinois court held that the reasons which
caused the Supreme Court to require these ele-
ments of an adversary criminal trial in the juvenile
court, also compel that delinquency, when based
on conduct that would be criminal for an adult,
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court pointed out that the euphemism,
training school or industrial school, cannot hide
the fact that such institutions are to some degree
penal in character, and that the incarcerated
juvenile's liberty of action is restrained just as
effectively as that of an adult immates serving
in state and federal prisons.
This holding struck down part of Illinois'
juvenile court act that specifically required a
preponderance of evidence test for delinquents,
but the court explicitly upheld this standard in
dependency and neglect cases where incarceration
in an institution for delinquents is not a permissible
disposition.
Comment: Illinois is the first jurisdiction to
establish this burden of proof for delinquency
cases. It is at least possible, however, that the
United States Supreme Court will explicitly make
"beyond a reasonable doubt" the test as a matter
of constitutional law. The case of In Re Wzitting-
ton-U.S.-(1967) presents this issue.
It will be interesting to see how the new test
operates in Illinois. Before the case was decided
there was much trepidation that such a holding
would wreck havoc in a court where frequently
the state's only witness is a twelve or thirteen
year old child. Early reports from the Cook County
court, however, are that the rule can be lived with,
and apparently conviction rates have not dropped
significantly.
Such results are hopeful, but they also raise
the fear that possibly the new test is "beyond a
reasonable doubt" in name only. All juvenile
court contests are bench trials, and since the trial
judge has such wide discretion, the concern re-
mains that we may be engaging in semantic
pedantics and calling it progress.
Transfer Of Trial For Convenience Of Prosecu-
tion Ground For Reversal-Dupoint v. United
States, 388 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1968). Dupoint was
convicted of possession of an unregistered dis-
tillery and of working at a distillery where required
signs had not been posted. The alleged offense
took place in the Thomasville Division of the
United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Georgia. Dupoint was arraigned in that
division but, because of a lack of a legal jury panel,
the trial was transferred to the Valdosta Division,
42 miles farther from the scene of the alleged of-
fense. The Court of Appeals held that since the
trial was transferred for the convenience of the
prosecution and not for the convenience of the
defendant or witnesses, the defendant was en-
titled to a reversal. It remanded the case to the
district court.
The decision rested upon Rule 18, Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., as effective
July 1, 1966. Prior to that date Rule 18 provided
that the place of trial should be in the division
of the district in which the offense took place.
New Rule 18 allows the court to fix, with due re-
gard for the convenience of the defendant and the
witnesses, the place of trial within the district
where the offense was committed.
The Court of Appeals held that, although the
district court judges are now able to transfer
trials among divisions, they can do this only for
the convenience of the defendant and witnesses.
It emphasized that the convenience of the govern-
ment is not a factor under new Rule 18. The public
policy of this country is that one cannot arbitrarily
and without his consent be removed to a "strange
locality to defend himself against the powerful
prosecutorial resources of the Government". The
Court of Appeals felt that the record showed the
transfer was made solely for the prosecution's
convenience.
Eavesdropping Without A Search Warrant-
United States v. Hagarty, 388 F.2d 713 (7th Cir.
1968). The defendant was a criminal investigator
for the Internal Revenue Service. Through an
electronic eavesdropping device he was heard
1968]
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discussing a criminal tax fraud investigation with
a trial attorney employed by the Internal Revenue
Service Regional office in Chicago. About two
years later, the District Director of Internal Reve-
nue wrote the defendant and told him to appear
for an interview under oath. A transcribed inter-
view was conducted by an inspector with the
defendant being sworn and advised of his Fifth
Amendment rights, but he was not advised that
the interview was being tape-recorded. At this
interview, the defendant stated that he did not
recall the meeting with the tax trial attorney.
The tape-recording of this previous meeting was
played to refresh the defendant's memory, and
the defendant asserted his memory was not re-
freshed. He also refused to give a voice example.
The defendant was indicted for testifying falsely
at the interview conducted by an inspector of the
Internal Revenue Service. He was convicted of
perjury and appealed.
The issue was whether the evidence of the de-
fendant's conversation with the trial attorney
obtained by eavesdropping "without a search
warrant and without judicial sanction, is banned
by the Fourth Amendment". This case was ap-
pealed before Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) was decided. In Katz, the Supreme Court
reversed a conviction where the government had
introduced evidence obtained through an eaves-
dropping device. In Katz, as here, no search war-
rant had been obtained nor had the surveillance
been judicially authorized. The surveillance in
Katz was held to be "per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment".
Defendant's conviction was reversed on appeal
on the basis of Katz. In so doing the court rejected
several Government contentions. The Government
urged that the office which was the subject of
eavesdropping was not a constitutionally protected
area. The court said that the "Fourth Amendment
applies wherever a man may be .... " It also re-
jected the Government's contention that "the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search
of government premises in the course of an investi-
gation relating to the conduct of governmental
business". The court said that "no compelling
reasons have been advanced to justify the absence
of a search warrant" or to dispense with the re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment.
Warrantless Searches Incident To Arrest-Niro
v. United States, 388 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1968);
State v. McCoy, 437 P.2d 734 (Ore. 1968). In
Niro, the defendants were convicted of knowing
possession of stolen goods as prohibited by a
federal statute. The goods were seized by F.B.I.
agents on defendant's property at the time of
arrest. They had kept a surveillance of the premises
after receiving information which indicated that
the defendants had hijacked several trucks. Even
though the agents had probable cause to believe
that the defendants were storing the contraband,
they had not obtained a search warrant.
The conviction was reversed; "If no penalty
will ever attach to a failure to seek a warrant, as
distinguished from the officers making their own,
correct, determination of probable cause, war-
rants will never be sought, at least when the search
is expected to be accompanied by an arrest."
In McCoy, the defendant appealed a rape con-
viction. Incriminating evidence was found an hour
after the arrest in a car in which the crime was
committed. At the time of the arrest, the car was
ten feet from the place where defendant was ap-
prehended by the police. The Oregon Supreme
Court held the search of the car was a valid one
incident to the defendant's arrest, and the absence
of a warrant was irrelevant. The court noted that
even though the defendant was not arrested in
the car, and the search of the car was conducted
an hour after the arrest, the arrest and the search
were one continuous act. If the car was closely
related to the reasons for the defendant's arrest,
the court explained, the materials found in it would
be incident to the arrest and admissible. The court
found the car to be an instrumentality of the crime
and thus subject to a search.
The dissent, while partially basing its rationale
on the state constitutional right of privacy, took
a position similar to the Niro court. Justice O'Con-
nell said that warrantless searches incident to an
arrest are reasonable only when the police "cannot
await the obtaining of a warrant". United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), the dissent
noted, did not hold that a warrant is never a
requirement for reasonableness; its holding is
applicable only when it is impossible to retain
one. The dissent also commented that the confu-
sion in recent federal search and seizure cases as
to standards governing reasonableness results
from ".... the failure to maintain a constant and
consistent view of the essentiality of the search
warrant in protecting the constitutional right of
privacy".
Comment-The McCoy court condones the
search of the automobile for incriminating evidence
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by labeling it as incidental to the arrest that oc-
curred one hour before. By construing the search
and the arrest as one continuous act, the court,
without giving careful thought to the circumstances
of the arrest and its relationship to the search,
holds no warrant is required. Yet the defendant
was not arrested while in the automobile, the
policedid not knowwhat evidence waslocated there,
and, in fact, they did have time to secure a war-
rant. These crucial facts the court ignores. The
court's reliance on Rabinowitz is incorrect if it
believes the holding there was that police never
need a search warrant if the search itself is reason-
able. Rabinowitz is important because it rejects
any "litmus paper test". The Court said that "the
recurring questions of reasonableness of searches
must find resolution in the facts and circumstances
of each case". Trupiano was overruled because
it set up an inflexible test that search warrants
are required when practicable. Further, the facts
in Rabinowitz cannot be analogized to McCoy.
The search of the defendant's office was conducted
there at the time of the arrest. The relationship
between the search and the arrest was factually
apparent; the Court did not need to resort to a
fiction as the McCoy court did. By ignoring the
specific facts of the case before it, McCoy, while
claiming to rest its decision on Rabinowitz, is
misinterpreting the significance of the Court's
holding there.
Unreasonable To Search Auto As Incident To
Arrest In House-Comnmonwealth v. Harris, 239
A.2d 290 (Pa., 1968). Upon receiving information
linking defendant to certain stolen goods, two
city police detectives proceeded without a search
warrant to the residence of defendant's friend to
arrest the defendant. Subsequently, defendant
drove up in an automobile which he parked in
front of the house. As defendant entered the house,
the detectives arrested and handcuffed him and
asked to search the automobile. Defendant agreed
to this request but stated that the automobile
did not belong to him. The officer then proceeded
to the automobile, searched it in the presence of
the defendant, and found burglary tools and a
brief case in the trunk. These items were allowed
into evidence at defendant's trial wherein he was
ultimately convicted of burglary, larceny, re-
ceiving stolen goods, and possession of burglary
tools. After an appeal, remand, and another ap-
peal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed
and ordered a new trial on the ground that the
aforementioned evidence had been obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The major issue before the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania was whether the search was incident
to the arrest so as to fall within an exception to
the constitutional rule which requires a search
warrant. The court stated that this exception
applies only to things within the defendant's
immediate control and within the immediate
vicinity of the arrest. The test is what is "reason-
able" as to the area searched. Although the court
recognized that readily movable objects may be
the subject of wider searches than fixed structures
under this test, it held that the search in this case
was not confined to the immediate vicinity of the
arrest and hence could not be sustained as mci-
dental thereto. Furthermore, the court held that
defendant's apparent approval of the search did
not render it lawful. Consent must be freely given
to be effective. But here the arrest and handcuffing
were sufficiently coercive and intimidating to
prevent an effective consent. Therefore, it was
constitutionally impermissible to use the evidence
seized in this search.
Visual Search Invalidated As Invasion Of Pri-
vacy-State v. Gomzales, 388 F.2d 145 (5th Cir.
1968). Defendant was serving a sentence for illegal
possession of narcotics. His conviction was based
on evidence obtained by a police officer who stood
on a drainpipe protruding from the residence in
which Gonzales was a guest and thus observed
Gonzales and others capping heroin. The district
court granted Gonzales' application for a writ of
habeas corpus. It reasoned that, while mere physi-
cal invasion of land would not invalidate an other-
wise valid search, the Fourth Amendment protec-
tion was co-extensive with the area around the
residence known at common law as the curtilage.
The officer's invasion of the curtilage was a tres-
pass and, since he did not have probable cause to
suspect narcotics were possessed in the residence at
this time, peering into the residence constituted
an unreasonable search.
The State of Texas appealed, contending that
no trespass had taken place since ". . . the eye
cannot commit the trespass condemned by the
Fourth Amendment.. ." (p. 147). The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circdit affirmed. But it was
unwilling to rest its decision solely upon an invasion
of the curtilage theory. It noted that the Supreme
Court has increasingly discarded such fictional
19681
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property concepts when considering issues of
privacy. The Court of Appeals held that the exist-
ence of a search was not determined according to
whether a trespass had been committed under
local property law. Since the essence of the pro-
hibition of unreasonable searches is the prevention
of "arbitrary intrusions" of privacy, a search
takes place whenever there is an intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area. The Court of
Appeals relied upon Brock v. United States, 223
F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1955) to show such an intrusion
could take place visually. In Brock it was held
that standing on a man's premises and looking
into his window was a search. The Court of Ap-
peals thus ruled that since the officer did not have
probable cause, the search was an unwarranted
governmental intrusion and affirmed the district
court decision.
Admissibility Of Evidence Discovered While
Car Being Lawfully Impounded-Harris v. United
States-U.S.-(1968). The petitioner, convicted of
robbery, appealed on the grounds that the auto-
mobile registration card of the victim was obtained
through an improper search of petitioner's car and
was erroneously admitted into evidence. The
petitioner's car was observed at the scene of the
robbery, traced, and the petitioner was arrested
as he entered the car. The police impounded the
car as evidence. Police regulations required the
impounding officer to search the vehicle to remove
all valuables and tag the vehicle. As the officer
was rolling up the windows to protect the car
from the rain and locking the doors, he noticed
the registration card lying on the floor. The ad-
missibility of evidence found as a result of search
and seizure under police regulation was not in
issue. Rather the Supreme Court held that nothing
in the Fourth Amendment required the police
to obtain a warrant when the evidence was ob-
tained not as a result of a search but as the result
of a measure taken to protect the car from the rain
while it was in police custody. When the object
was plainly in the view of an officer who had a
right to be in position to obtain that view, no
illegal search and seizure was involved.
Berger Denied Retroactivity-People v. Mor-
house, 233 N.E.2d 705 (N.Y. 1967). The defendant
appealed a conviction for bribery based on the
adverse testimony of witnesses originally overheard
by an eavesdropping device set up by the police
on court order pursuant to the state statute. The
statute was declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Berger v.
State of New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), because it
was violative of the Fourth Amendment search
and seizure protections as incorporated in the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that
any evidence produced from eavesdropping au-
thorized by the state statute is inadmissible. The
Berger ruling was delivered after the defendant
in this case had been convicted, but during the
pendency of his appeal.
The New York Court of Appeals held that Berger
did not have retroactive status to this case, where
the trial had been concluded before the ruling
was announced. It therefore remanded the case
to a hearing in order to determine whether the
eavesdropping orders were properly issued under
the now voided statute. If it would be found below
that the orders were validly observed, then the
evidence received from the unconstitutional
statute would stand.
In a vigorous dissent, judge Christ argued that
Berger should be given retroactive effect; this
would require a full reversal of the case and a new
trial de novo. The Judge analogized Berger to the
retroactivity of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
as explained in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1964).
Information Inadmissible Where Obtained
During Unlawful Arrest-United States v. Ruffin,
389 F.2d 76 (7th Cir. 1968). Defendants appealed
from convictions of unlawful interstate transporta-
tion of a stolen motor vehicle and unlawful receipt
and concealment of the vehicle. They predicated
error on the ground that critical evidence upon
which their convictions were based emanated
from, and was the product of, an illegal arrest
made without probable cause.
The arrest was made by an off-duty police
sergeant who was employed at the time as a motel
security officer. He observed defendants pull into
the motel parking lot at 2:15 A.M., park, turn off
the car lights but not the motor. As the officer
approached the car he saw defendant Ruffin
running between two parked cars and promptly
drove his automobile into a position to block the
movement of the defendants' car. The officer
investigated, noticed a large amount of clothing
strewn about the back seat of the car. Not having
received adequate answers to his questions from
the defendants, the security officer called for a
police crew and requested a license plate check.
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Ten minutes later, at 2:25 A.M., the police arrived,
and the radio dispatcher advised them that the
license plate number was that of a stolen car.
The government contended the arrest was based
on probable cause and reasonable grounds, or, in
the alternative, that even if the arrest had been
unlawful, the conviction of the defendants was
not the result of evidence which was "tainted
fruit of the poisonous tree". The Court of Appeals
rejected both of the government arguments and
reversed the conviction. The court said that at
the point of the off-duty officer's detention (or
arrest) it was unlikely that the defendants would
have had sufficient opportunity to have taken
any clothing from another automobile in the park-
ing lot; although the activities gave cause for
suspicion, there was nothing upon which to base
a reasonable belief that defendants had stolen
the clothing or that the vehicle was stolen property.
The court also held that the illegal arrest re-
quired the exclusion from evidence of the informa-
tion concerning the automobile obtained while
the defendants were restrained. The court said
that it was the check on the license plate while
defendants were detained under an unlawful arrest
which led to the evidence that they were in posses-
sion of the stolen auto. "But for such unlawful
arrest and detention, and the routine checking
of the license plate, it is purely speculative that
the defendants' offenses would have come to
light". The corpus delicti, the substance of the
offense and most essential element, was directly
the product of the illegal arrest and thus was the
"tainted fruit of the poisonous tree".
Supreme Court Rule On State Obscenity Laws
For Minors-Ginsberg v. New York,-U.S.-
(1968); Interstate Circuit, Inc, v. City of Dallas,--
U.S.-(1968). In Ginsberg the defendant sold two
"girlie-type" magazines to a sixteen year old boy.
He was convicted of a violation of a New York
statute that proscribes the sale of magazines, which
depict "nudity" in a manner that is "harmful to
minors", to those under seventeen years of age.
After affirmance by the New York Court of Ap-
peals, the defendant appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States. He urged two grounds
for reversal: first, that it is an unconstitutional
deprivation of First Amendment freedom of ex-
pression to deny minors access to material that is
not obscene for persons over seventeen years of
age; secondly, in any event the statute is void
because it is unconstitutionally vague.
The Supreme Court rejected both arguments
and affirmed the conviction. Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, admitted that the maga-
zines would not be obscene for adults. Nonetheless,
the majority adopted a test of variable obscenity
and held that such material could be considered
obscene for children just the same. The Court
then stressed that the well-being of its children
was within the State's constitutional power to
regulate. It found that the New York legislature
could rationally conclude that exposure to ma-
terial condemned by the statute is harmful to
minors. Therefore, the provision does not deny
freedom of expression.
Secondly, the Court held that the statute was
not unconstitutionally vague, but gave adequate
notice of what activity was prohibited. The Court
noted that the regulation requires the element of
scienter and forbids only sales made knowingly
to minors. Also, the majority stressed that the
phrase "harmful to minors" is sufficiently defined
because it incorporates the Court's own statement
of the elements of obscenity. The statute defines
this phrase as pictures having "that quality of
nudity that (1) predominantly appeals to the
prurient shameful or morbid interests of minors,
(2) and is patently offensive to prevailing standards
in the adult community as a whole with respect to
what is suitable for minors, (3) is utterly without
redeeming social importance for minors". (italics
added).
Justices Douglas and Black dissented. They
objected to the majority applying the "rational
relationship" test of substantive due process to
limitations of freedom of expression. They would
hold that the First Amendment forbids all inter-
ference with printed matter.
But, in Interstate Circuit, the Supreme Court
struck down the city's movie censorship ordinance.
This regulation provided for classification of
films as "suitable for young persons" under sixteen
years of age or as "not suitable". It was required
that films be submitted to a Motion Picture Classi-
fication Board before being exhibited. In this case
the Board classified the film Viva Maria as "not
suitable for young persons", and the county court
enjoined its exhibition in violation of the classifica-
tion. This ruling was affirmed by the Texas Court
of Civil Appeals.
The Supreme Court of the United States found
this ordinance was unconstitutionally vague in
violation of the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Majority held that the
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language did not provide minimum guidelines
for the censors' determinations. The Court ob-
jected to the fact that films were classified unsuita-
ble for young persons where they portrayed "nu-
dity or sexual promiscuity... in such a manner
as to be in the judgment of the Board, likely to
incite juvenile delinquency or sexual promiscuity
or appeal to their prurient interests," and the
determination of "nudity" and "sexual promis-
cuity" was left essentially to the censors without
further guidelines. Also, the test of what was
likely to incite delinquency and sexual promiscuity
was left entirely to the Board's discretion.
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, also
stated that de novo review by a court was no cure
for the latitude given to the Board, because vague
standards encourage erratic administration of the
law whether the censor is administrative or judi-
cial. The majority also emphasized that the First
Amendment interests were broader than those of
the film maker, exhibitor, and youths under six-
teen. The Court feared that in order to avoid
running afoul of this type of restriction, film
makers might restrict themselves solely to innocu-
ous films. Thus freedom of expression would be
restricted among all the people in the land.
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. After noting
that verbal formulae in the entire area of obscenity
are at best inexact, he stated that the majority
would demand greater precision of language from
the City of Dallas than the Court itself can give
in this area.
Jury Determination Of Death Penalty Under
Federal Kidnapping Act Held Unconstitutional-
United States v. Jackson,--U.S.-(1968). The de-
fendant was indicted under the Federal Kidnapping
Act which makes it a federal crime for a kidnaper
to transport his victim in interstate commerce.
The United States District Court sitting in Con-
necticut dismissed the case after finding that the
Act was unconstitutional. The invalid section
ordered that the death penalty for kidnapers
whose victims have not been liberated unharmed
be recommended by the jury only.
The Supreme Court of the United States held
the section unconstitutional, but found that the
section could be severed from the rest of the Act.
Justice Stewart, for the Court, explained that
the section discourages the defendant from his
Fifth Amendment right to plead not guilty and
his Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury
trial. "The defendant who abandons the right to
contest his guilt before a jury," he said, "is as-
sured that he cannot be executed; the defendant
ingenuous enough to seek a jury acquittal stands
forewarned that, if the jury finds him guilty and
does not wish to spare his life, he will die". The
accused, then, is discouraged from utilizing the
right to a jury trial since he knows that they-
not the judge-are the only ones that can impose
the death penalty.
Even though this section was held unconstitu-
tional, the Court held it severable from the remain-
ing portion of the Act because it ".... is a func-
tionally independent part of the... Act. Its
elimination in no way alters the substantive reach
of the statute and leaves completely unchanged
its basic operation".
M'Naghten Upheld As Insanity Test For Glue-
Sniffer-Pierce v. Tvrner, 276 F.Supp. 289 (Utah
1967). Petitioner was convicted upon a jury verdict
of second degree murder, for the stabbing of a
companion while they were both sniffing glue.
After exhausting his state remedies the de-
fendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in federal district court. An evidentiary hearing
was held and the case submitted on two issues.
The first is whether the M'Naghten test is
constitutionally permissible under the circum-
stances of this case. The defendant attacked its
applicability by submitting that a) the active
organic solvent Toluene involved in glue sniffing
may cause toxic psychosis; b) this knowledge was
not acquired prior to 1960; c) M'Naghten has
medical application only with respect to demented
persons and not Toluene psychosis; d) whereas
alcohol induced intoxication causes no psychosis
short of withdrawal, this is not true of Toluene
induced psychosis; e) only a legal test of insanity
that would acquit one who, due to a mental disease
or defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreacite
the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the law would be a medically fair and
reasonable test of insanity, including toxic psycho-
sis. To use another test constitutes a deprivation
of due process and any punishment steming from
a conviction under another test was cruel and
unusual.
The district court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment. It conceded that the M'Naghten test, even
with an irresistible impulse supplementation may
not be the most scientifically precise, but this
does not render its use unconstitutional.
"The choice of a test of legal insanity involves
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not only scientific knowledge, but questions of
basic policy concerning the extent to which that
knowledge should govern criminal responsibility."
The court held that any faults of the M'Naghten
test do not carry this case beyond the bounds of
due process or render it one of cruel or unusual
punishment.
The second issue raised by the petition was the
propriety and effect of the trial court's instruction
on "voluntary intoxication", considered together
with the insanity charge.
The voluntary intoxication charge said basically
that voluntary intoxication caused by the use of
Toluene does not relieve a person of criminal re-
sponsibility for acts committed under the influence,
except that the jury could consider the fact of
intoxication in deciding if the offender intended
any of the acts he committed. If the defendant
was incapable of forming an intent to commit the
crime charged then he would not be guilty.
The defendant argued that this instruction
tended to neutralize the insanity instruction, that
the jury might have found him insane under
M'Naghten but nevertheless criminally responsible
under the voluntary intoxication instruction. This
argument the court also rejected, saying that the
latter instruction did not preempt the former,
especially since it too incorporated the element
of intent as a prerequisite for guilt. Even if this
instruction constituted mere error, it did not rise
to the level of a constitutional infirmity.
The court continued that in its opinion the
defendant was not even entitled to the instruc-
tions he obtained, since even if he was insane, as
a matter of policy, temporary insanity brought
on by voluntary intoxication is no defense to
homicide. The state may make this choice with-
out depriving the defendant of due process. The
court did not reach the difficult problems presented
by the conviction of a person for criminal acts
committed while he is addicted to a form of in-
toxication.
Imprisonment For Public Drunkenness Of A
Chronic Alcoholic Not A Cruel And Unusual
Punishment-Seattle v. Hill, 435 P.2d 692 (Wash.
1967). A policeman found the defendant on a
public sidewalk at an early morning hour, drunk
to the point of helplessness. He was convicted of
public drunkenness and appealed.
The defendant urged that he suffered from
chronic addictive alcoholism, a disease, and that
this disease rendered him powerless to avoid
violating the ordinance, since being drunk in
public is a principal symptom of the disease, and
that, therefore, at least as to himself, to be con-
victed of a status, was in violation of the prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishments in
both the United States and Washington Constitu-
tions. Cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962).
The defendant also alleged that the ordinance
is un unreasonable exercise of the police power
and deprived the defendant of his liberty without
due process of law.
A majority of the Washington Supreme Court
sitting en banw rejected the defendant's arguments
and affirmed his conviction. The court held
that laws forbidding public drunkenness bear a
manifest relationship to public peace, health and
safety and thus fall within the city's police power
and are not a denial of due process, nor cruel and
unusual punishment.
The court apparently believed that the de-
fendant was a chronic alcoholic and grugingly
accepted that he could not voluntarily stop drink-
ing. But it refused his contentions that he could
not restrain himself from public presentation of
himself while intoxicated. This conclusion was
reached because of the testimony of judge Charles
Smith, then of the Seattle municipal court, that
90% of the alcoholics in the Seattle area managed
to escape prosecution under this statute. The
majority concludes from this that the other 10%
should be able to do likewise.
The court pointed out that this offense was not
that of being an alcoholic, but being drunk in
public. The defendant was prosecuted, not for
what he was, but for what he was doing, that is,
being drunk on the street.
Because the ordinance punishes the behavior
of being drunk in public, and because, according
to the court, even a chronic addictive alcoholic
can voluntarily keep himself off the street when
intoxicated, the defendant cannot complain that
being placed in jail is cruel and unusual.
The majority agreed with the defendant that
imprisonment is not the ideal way to handle al-
coholics. It submitted, however, that any change
is in the realm of the legislature.
Chief Justice Finley dissents from the conclu-
sions of the majority as to the ability of the chronic
addictive alcoholic to control his behavior. He
refutes the holding that an alcoholic need not
appear intoxicated in public, both as a scientific
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fact, and as indicated by the facts presented by
Judge Smith and accepted by the majority.
These data are biased in three ways according
to the dissent. First the 10% figure represents
only those individuals who appear for trial, and
if one has $20.00 for bail he may buy himself out
of this consequence. Secondly, only people who
are broke and have no where to go are arrested
for drunkenness alone. Thirdly, the chronic ad-
dictive alcoholics represent only a small percentage
of the total population of alcoholics that judge
Smith spoke of, and persons in this group are
frequently arrested.
Simply because there may be no actus reus
as to public drunkeness, however, does not mean
there is a similar defense for all crimes, according
to the dissent.
Comment: The majority in this case speaks
of mens rea and whether the chronic alcoholic
intends his behavior to a sufficient degree to be
responsible for them. It also speaks to the issue
of whether the chronic alcoholic may possess
sufficient volition as to the prosecuted for other
crimes, or whether drunkenness is a defense to
those offenses.
As the dissent points out, neither of these two
questions is at issue here. The present issue is
solely whether appearing in public while intoxi-
cated is such a concomitant part of chronic alco-
holism that prosecution for this behavior con-
stitutes a criminal conviction for involuntary
behavior and thus conviction for a disease in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
To resolve this issue, one must decide two factual
questions. First, there is the issue of whether
chronic alcoholics in general can voluntarily
keep themselves out of public view. In this respect
the majority's arguments seem to be adequately
refuted by the dissent. The subject, however, could
use more research. If it is true that "chronic addic-
tive alcoholics" cannot control their whereabouts,
then Robinson appears to force a finding of uncon-
stitutionality whenever the second factual re-
quirement, that the defendant is a chronic alco-
holic, is fulfilled.
Probation Conditions Impossible of Performance
Are Improper-State v. Oyler, 436 P.2d 709 (Idaho,
1968). In April, 1966, defendant pleaded guilty
to the felony charge of driving a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
a repeated offense. He was placed on probation
subject to the condition that he refrain from the
use of alcoholic beverages for the period of one
year. Two months later the county prosecuting
attorney filed a motion for an order revoking
defendant's probation on the ground that he had
once again been arrested and charged with driving
a motor vehicle while intoxicated. A probation
revocation hearing was held at which there was
substantial evidence that defendant had been
intoxicated on the date in question. Defendant
admitted drinking heavily but argued that his
probation should not be revoked for breach of a
condition which was impossible for him to per-
form. In support of his contention that it was
impossible for him to perform this condition,
defendant introduced several witnesses who testi-
fied to his reputation as a drunk and a doctor
who labeled defendant a chronic alcoholic. The
trial judge concluded that defendant might be a
chronic alcoholic but that this was not sufficient
excuse for his conduct. The judge therefore revoked
defendant's probation and sentenced him to a
minimum of two years in the state penitentiary.
Defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court of Idaho held that imposi-
tion of a probation condition which is impossible
of fulfillment by a certain probationer would be
improper since not reasonably related to the
purpose of probation, rehabilitation. Furthermore,
the court stated that a probationer does not waive
his right to object to such conditions by the mere
acceptance of probation. The probationer may
raise this issue for the first time at the revocation
proceeding. The court therefore reversed the
revocation and remanded the case for a deter-
mination of whether the condition was impossible
for this probationer to perform. If it was impossible,
then the lower court judge would have the discre-
tion to remove probation and pronounce sentence.
The court recognized the problem as regards
chronic alcoholics and urged the state to provide
facilities for their treatment. One concurring
judge also stressed that incarceration may be the
only presently available remedy.
Comment: This case presents the problem of
what to do with the chronic alcoholic when the
state has not provided facilities for treatment. It
also presents the problem of what to do with
probation conditions which are impossible for
the particular probationer to perform. Faced
with these two problems, the Idaho court reversed
and remanded the case. But their dilemma was
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insurmountable. Either conclusion that the lower
,court reaches will result in the probationer's
return to prison. A state should devise better
means of treating chronic alcoholics.
Evidence Of Tracking By Police Dog Admissible
-Terrell v. State, 239 A.2d 128 (Ct.SpApp.Md.
1968). The defendant was convicted of robbery.
'Minutes after the crime was committed officers
arrived on the scene and followed a trail of coins
to a nearby alley. An officer stayed at the entrance
to the alley to protect the scene until a member
,f the Police K-9 Corps arrived with his German
Shepherd dog. The dog was put on the trail and
led the officers to a car parked a short distance
away. The defendant and a companion were
found lying on the seat of the auto along with ap-
proximately the amount of currency taken in
the robbery, and also two revolvers. The de-
fendant was then identified by the victim of the
robbery. Over objection, the trial judge admitted
the evidence of tracking by the police dog.
After a detailed discussion of cases in the area,
the higher court held that the evidence was prop-
erly admitted. The court stressed that the proper
foundation must be laid; that is, the qualifications
and training of the dog must be demonstrated.
In this case the dog's trainer, a man with many
years of experience, testified that the dog had
received an excellent rating in a fifteen week
training course. Also, the court stressed that the
dog had been put on the trail where it was ap-
parent that the perpetrators of the crime had
been, and there was no interruption of the tracking.
The court rejected the argument that the evidence
was hearsay because the dog could not be cross-
examined as to how it tracked the accused. It was
sufficient that the trainer was cross-examined as
to the dog's ability to track. It made no difference
that it can not be discovered how the dog per-
formed its task, as long as it could be shown that
it did so accurately.
Comment: This decision is in accord with the
majority rule adopted by about nineteen states.
See, for example, Commonwealth v. Le Page, 226
N.E.2d 200 (Mass. 1967), Dougherty v. Common-
wealth, 168 S.W.2d 564 (Ky. 1943). Six states have
adopted the opposite view. See, for example,
People v. Griffin, 198 N.E.2d 115 (Il. 1964), People
v. Whitlock, 171 N.Y.S. 109 (1918). These states
exclude the evidence primarily because neither
the court nor the jury can know why the dog does
one thing or another, the dog cannot be cross-
examined, and a feeling of distaste arises since a
man's liberty is put in jeopardy by the testimony
of a dog.
Oral Admissions At Scene Of Crime Inadmissible
Under Escobedo-State v. Michael, 436 P.2d 595
(Ariz., 1968). Defendant's wife with whom de-
fendant had had marital difficulties in the past,
was shot to death in defendant's bedroom with a
.22 caliber pistol which defendant admitted pos-
sessing. At the time of the shooting, defendant
was alone in the bedroom with his wife and four
other persons were in the house. When the police
arrived defendant's father stated that defendant
had shot his wife. As the ambulance attendants
were moving the deceased's body from the bed-
room, the defendant started to follow them. The
police officer testified that he took hold of de-
fendant's forearm in an effort to detain him
momentarily to ask him a question. When de-
fendant stopped walking, the officer released him
and asked him, "Where is the gun?". Defendant
then stated, "I shot my wife". About one-half
hour later, another police officer, who had been
informed of the above facts, questioned defendant
and received a second confession. After defendant's
arrest, and when he was in the police station, the
defendant told this second officer that he was an
attorney and he knew that his previous confes-
sions could not be used as evidence in court.
However, the two confessions and this conversa-
tion at the police station were admitted into
evidence at defendant's trial. Defendant was
convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced
to ten years to life. He appealed.
There were several issues before the Supreme
Court of Arizona, but the primary one was the
admissibility of the above testimony. In that the
case arose between the time of .Escobedo v. Illinois,
387 U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), and in the Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1967), held that Miranda
was not to be applied retroactively, the court in
this case limited its consideration to the rule of
Escobedo. This rule is that a person, upon whom
suspicion of guilt has been focused, must be af-
forded the right to counsel during police inter-
rogation when he is in custody. The court con-
cluded that the police officers' questions did
constitute interrogation and that the case had
passed from the investigatory to the accusatory
stage when they were asked. The investigation
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had begun to focus on defendant as a particular
suspect and therefore these questions were not
merely for the purpose of gathering information.
Rather, they were designed to obtain incrim-
inating statements from defendant when de-
fendant did not have the benefit of being properly
warned of his right to remain silent. The court
held, therefore, that the two admissions should
have been excluded as evidence. Despite the fact
that defendant was informed of his rights prior
to the statement at the police station, the court
held that this also should have been excluded
because the substance of the conversation was
based on the second inadmissible oral admission.
Due to these errors, the case was reversed and
remanded.
Comment: This case represents an extension of
Escobedo beyond the situation of custodial inter-
rogation at the police station to questions by the
investigating officer at the scene of the crime. The
court relied heavily on the fact that defendant's
father had implicated defendant and the fact that
the police officer had taken hold of defendant's
arm to detain him in the bedroom. The court
believed that these indicated that the accusatory
stage of the case had been reached. Query whether
the first police officer's question necessarily sub-
stantiates this conclusion. Since there had been a
shooting, should an officer be allowed to ask a
person who had been present where the gun was.
That the court gathered an accusatory impli-
cation from this indicates that there are certain
situations where the facts are so pointed toward
one individual as the criminal suspect that under
Escobedo the police cannot ask any questions of
that individual without first advising him of his
constitutional rights to counsel and to remain
silent. Even if the accusatory stage had been
reached, it is suggested that defendant's answer
to the first officer's question which was not re-
sponsive, was more in the nature of a volunteered
admission than a response to custodial interro-
gation. However, the underlying policy of Escobedo
was extended by applying its rule to this particular
defendant. Escobedo was concerned with the
character and mentality of the accused. Here,
while the accused had certain notice of his con-
stitutional rights as indicated by his statement at
the police station, nevertheless, the court believed
that he was still entitled to the "warnings".
Mathematical Probabilities Inadmissable As
Evidence-People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal.
1968). During the defendants' trial for robbery,
the state was experiencing difficulty in estab-
lishing the identities of the perpetrators of the
crime, because the victim was unable to identify
them, and descriptions by the witnesses were
incomplete. Witnesses to the robbery established
that it was committed by a Caucasian woman with
a blond ponytail who left the scene accompanied
by a Negro man with a beard and mustache, who
was driving a yellow Cadillac. The defendants
answered this description. To bolster the identi-
fication, the prosecutor called a math instructor
as a witness to determine the probability that
the crime was committed by any couple answering
such distinctive characteristics. The witness
had arrived at an answer based upon the "product
rule" which states that the probability of the joint
occurrence of a number of mutually independent
events is equal to the product of the individual
probabilities that each of the events will occur.
He concluded that the probability was but one
chance in 12 million that any couple possessed the
distinctive characteristics of the defendants. The
court held that the use of mathematical proba-
bilities was error, for (1) the testimony itself
lacked an adequate foundation both in evidence
and in statistical theory, (2) the testimony was
used to distract the jury from its proper function
of weighing the evidence of guilt.
The witness had failed to produce any statistical
evidence in support of the probabilities of the
factors selected, and had offered no proof that the
characteristics were mutually independent, though
this was essential to the product rule. As the court
pointed out, error in the probabilities of the factors,
or the extent that the factors were not mutually
independent, would yield an erroneous result.
Mathematical odds are not admissible as evidence
to identify a defendant so long as the odds are
based on estimates.
The court reasoned that few juries could resist
the temptation to accord disproportionate weight
to a numerical index of probable guilt. Also, such
a theory could not prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the state's witnesses correctly observed
and accurately described the distinctive features
which were used to link the defendants to the
crime. The probabilities computed represented,
at best, the likelihood that a random couple would
share the characteristics testified to by the pros-
ecution's witnesses-"not necessarily the charac-
teristics of the actually guilty couple".
In reversing the conviction, the court held in
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-view of the closeness of the case, which was mostly
-a circumstantial one, there was a reasonable
likelihood that the result would have been more
-favorable to the defendants had the prosecutor
not urged the jury to render a verdict based on
:probabilities.
Proof Of Waiver Of Constitutional Rights
Under Miranda-State v. Davis, 438 P.2d 185
(Wash. 1968). The issue in dispute was the validity
of an alleged waiver by the defendant of his con-
stitutional rights under Miranda. The State, while
offering testimony of one of the interrogators,
failed to produce or explain the absence of an
undersheriff who was present during the inter-
rogation. The trial court refused to instruct the
jury on the "missing witness" rule, which is to
the effect that the failure of the state to produce
the undersheriff as a witness to verify defendant's
waiver of his constitutional rights raised an in-
ference that his testimony would have been un-
favorable to the State's case.
In holding that the trial court erred in refusing
the instruction, the court rejected the State's
argument that the witness was equally available
to either party, and that the sheriff's testimony
would merely have been "cumulative". Upon
considering the heavy burden Miranda places on
the prosecutor to prove the validity of an alleged
waiver, the dose working affiliation between the
prosecutor and the undersheriff, and the sharp
conflict in testimony between the defendant and
the testifying officer, the court felt that the de-
fendant established the circumstances necessary
to give rise to the use of the missing witness rule.
The court concluded that, under Miranda,
"a heavy burden rests on the government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his privilege against self-
incrimination and his right to counsel". The court
felt this burden required a greater quantum and
quality of proof than it did in pre-Miranda cases
when it applied the "substantial evidence" test
upon review of the validity of the waiver. The
court stated that the trial judge must find ad-
missibility beyond a reasonable doubt before a
confession may be submitted to the jury, and that
no presumptions are available to the prosecution
in its attempt to prove a valid waiver. The court
found that in the present case the state failed to
meet its burden of proving the validity of the
waiver, in that (1) the admission was made while
the defendant was in police custody, (2) pre-
sumably the police had means to establish cor-
roborating evidence, (3) the testifying officer's
evidence was completely contradicted by the
defendant, and (4) a second officer present during
the interrogation was not called as a corroborating
witness by the state nor was his absence explained.
Miranda And Retrials-Boone v. State, 237
A.2d 787 (Md. Ct.Spec.App. 1968). This is another
in the growing list of cases attempting to decide
whether the Miranda rule should be applied to
retrials occurring after the date of the Miranda
decision when the original trial was held before
that date. The precise meaning of the Supreme
Court's statement in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384
U.S. 719, at 721 (1966), that Miranda applies
only to cases in which the trial begins after the
date of the decision, is the issue.
Defendant was tried and convicted of murder
in March of 1966. This conviction was reversed
because of a defective verdict and the defendant
was granted a retrial. The court held that the
Miranda warnings, as a prerequisite for the ad-
missibility of a statement otherwise freely and
voluntarily made, were not to be applied to re-
trials occurring after the decision in Miranda,
when the cases had been originally, tried on a
valid indictment before that date. The court
said that the purpose of Miranda did not demand
application of the rule to retrials. Holding such a
rule applicable to retrials would effect no signifi-
cant improvement in the retrial since standards
of voluntariness were sufficient protection for
the defendant. Such a ruling, said a majority of the
court, would be inconsistent with the desire of
the Supreme Court to give stability to trials
which began before Miranda.
Tacit Admission Rule Held A Violation Of
Due Process-U.S. ex rel. Staino v. Brierly, 387
F.2d 597 (3rd Cir. 1967). The defendant, con-
victed of burglary, petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus after the exhaustion of his state remedies.
On two occasions after his arrest he had been
read a confession of a co-defendant which im-
plicated him in the crime. The police were careful
to warn the defendant that any statements that
he made might be used against him. At trial the
interrogating officers testified that when the
defendant was faced with the accusatory state-
ments, he remained silent. The trial judge care-
fully instructed the jury on the theory of tacit
admission, explaining that the incriminating
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statement could be considered probative against
the defendant only if the jury found that an in-
nocent person in his position would have denied
the accusation and that failure to do so reflected
consciousness of guilt.
The court questioned the validity of the tacit
admission theory in cases where one's supposedly
normal response to accusatory statements might be
overcome by the police warning that any remarks
made by the defendant might be used against
him. The court concluded that the interrogations
were a stratagem used by the police to confront
the defendant with accusatory statements under
conditions calculated to discourage response.
The unfairness of the procedure was reinforced
by the fact that the defendant was kept incom-
municado for some time and questioned on two
occasions without the assistance of counsel.
No Constitutional Right To Jury Trial In Delin-
quent Proceedings-Estes v. Superior Court, 438
P.2d 205 (Wash. 1968). The defendant, sixteen
years old, was ordered confined to a juvenile
institution. His counsel alleged as error the fact
that the delinquency proceeding was held without
a jury. The court, while taking note that reforms
were being made in juvenile proceedings in the
areas of notice of hearings, right to counsel, right
against self-incrimination, and the right to cross-
examine witnesses, held that a jury trial was not
a constitutional requisite. The juvenile must be
offered the benefits of an informal hearing at which
rules of fairness and basic procedural rights are
observed, and such results can be obtained without
the formality of a jury trial. The court pointed
out that one of the substantial benefits of the
juvenile process is a private informal hearing
conducted without a jury.
The court also rejected the defendant's claim
that the trial court erred in refusing to set bail
pending the appeal. The court was of the opinion
that denying of bail in no way denied the defend-
ant the "essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment". The court pointed out that allowing the
minor to go free on bail would in many cases be
adverse to minor's welfare, in that the minor
would be returned to the environment which
caused his problems initially and where there was
no guidance. By retaining the minor, he could
receive care and training.
State Must Provide Indigent Minutes of Prior
Trial-People v. Ballott, 233 N.E. 2d 103 (N.Y.
1967). Defendant was convicted of robbery and
related offenses at a second trial after his first
trial had ended in a jury disagreement. Defendant
allegedly robbed two women employees of their
company's payroll which they were delivering.
Approximately one year after the robbery defend-
ant was arrested and was at that time exhibited
by the police alone in a room at the station to one
of the women who had been robbed. The woman
identified defendant as the man who had robbed
her after he had put on clothes similar to those
worn at the time of the crime and had spoken
the same words used.
After defendant's case was set for the second
trial he requested, after a two month postpone-
ment, an additional week adjournment in order
to raise the remaining $50 out of $300 for the
minutes of his first trial. The court denied this
application and proceeded to trial. Defendant
asserts that this ruling denied him equal protection
and deprived him, because of his indigency, of
his right to confront the witnesses against him
with their prior testimony and to prepare an
adequate defense.
The Court of Appeals of New York reversed
the judgment and ordered a new trial. The court
said that being deprived of the minutes was a
denial of a substantial right, and the court should
either have adjourned the case or, if the defendant
was indigent, have directed that the minutes be
transcribed at public expense and furnished to
the defendant.
Defendant also argued that the police station
identification procedure violated his constitutional
guarantees rendering the in-court identification
inadmissible as evidence. The court agreed that
pre-trial identification procedure may be so un-
fair as to amount to a denial of due process. It
added, that once pre-trial identification procedure
is shown to be improper any in-court identifi-
cation, while not per se excludable, should not be
received in evidence without proof by the state by
"clear and convincing evidence" that the in-court
identification was based upon observations of the
suspect of independent origin other than the show-
up identification.
State Must Make Good Faith Effort To Obtain
Presence of Witness-Barker v. Pagej--U.S.-
(1968). Petitioner and one Woods were charged
with robbery and at a preliminary hearing Woods
gave testimony that incriminated the petitioner,
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